Naval Staff Appreciation of Requirements for the 1935 Naval Conference (Extract)
PART X – SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS
General Strategical Requirements for Security.
154. We should be able to send to the Far East a Fleet sufficient to provide “cover’ against the Japanese Fleet; we should have sufficient additional forces behind this shield for the protection of our territories and mercantile marine against Japanese attack; at the same time, we should be able to retain in European waters a force sufficient to act as a deterrent and to prevent the strongest European Naval Power from obtaining control of our vital home terminal areas while we can make the necessary redistributions.
Duration of the Treaty
155. It is proposed that the Treaty should remain in force for a period of about 10 years.
Capital Ships.
156. (a) We should seek a qualitative limit of 25,000 tons with 12-in. guns, but can accept a figure as high as 28,000 tons with 12-in. guns.
(b) We should seek to maintain the Washington ratio of 15:9:5 for ourselves, Japan and the strongest European Navy.
(c) The ratios for capital ships of European Powers, other than France, do not affect our security, except in so far as they tend to increase French demands, provided that no European Power exceeds France’s ratio.
(d) We should seek numerical limitation of capital ships, but can only accept it if it is universally agreed to by all important naval Powers.
(e) If France or any other important Power refuses numerical limitation, we should accept a total tonnage limitation of the capital ship category based on 15 ships of the maximum qualitative size.
(f) It is essential to begin replacement of capital ships in 1937, and we should seek an agreed replacement programme for the principal naval Powers at the rate of 3 ships in 2 years for ourselves and the United States, and a corresponding rate for Japan.
Cruisers.
157. (a) 8-in. gun Cruisers. – We should propose that no more ships of this type should be built.
(b) Large 6-in. Gun Cruisers. – The Washington ratio vis-à-vis Japan to be established by number, giving us and the United States each 10 ships vis-à-vis Japan’s 6 ships. No others of this class to be built.
(c) Other 6-in. Gun Cruisers. – We should seek a qualitative limitation of 7,000 tons with 6.2-in. guns, but can accept as high a limit as 7,500 tons with 6.1-in. guns.
(d) We require 26,000 tons under-age in this class plus 50,000 tons over-age. We can accept as a maximum that Japan should have such a tonnage in this class as to make her total cruiser tonnage 60 per cent. of our own, and that France should have a tonnage of 6-in. gun cruisers and destroyers, combined, not more than 50 per cent. of our 6-in. gun cruisers and destroyers combined.
(e) Provided that (a), (b), and (c) above were achieved, we could accept that no quantitative limitation should be placed on 6-in. gun cruiser tonnage to be built in the future.
Aircraft Carriers.
158. In the absence of any international restriction on “military” aircraft –
(a) We should seek a qualitative limitation of 22,000 tons with 6.1-in. guns.
(b) On this basis we require a minimum total tonnage in the category of 110,000.
(c) We should maintain the Washington Treaty ratio of 5:3:2.2 for British Commonwealth, Japan and France or Italy.
Destroyers.
159. (a) We should refuse any increase of the present destroyer category qualitative limit of 1,850 tons with 5.1-in. guns.
(b) We should seek agreement that in future replacement no more than 16 per cent. of the tonnage in the destroyer category should be employed in vessels of over 1,5000 tons, but that some arrangement should be made for the period of the Treaty by which the British Commonwealth of Nations may, nevertheless, so employ not more than 27½ per cent.
(c) We should endeavour to obtain the agreement of France and all other Powers to the limits in (a) and (b) above.
(d) If submarines are abolished, we should accept a limit of 100,000 tons in the destroyer category.
(e) We should accept a limit of 150,000 tons in the destroyer category in relation to a submarine tonnage of 40,000 tons for any one Power.
(f) If submarine tonnage cannot be so reduced we require 200,000 tons in the destroyer category of which not more than 150,000 tons may be under the age limit of 16 years.
(g) We should consent to Japan having a total destroyer tonnage not exceeding 65 per cent. of our own, not more than 105,500 tons being under age.
(h) We should accept for France either a destroyer tonnage 50 per cent. of our own, or a light surface vessel category tonnage 60 per cent. of our corresponding tonnage.
Submarines.
160. (a) We should repeat our conviction that the total abolition of submarines is desirable and that, failing total abolition, they should be limited to a unite size of 250 tons.
(b) Failing (a), we should retain the existing qualitative limitation of 2,000 tons standard displacement and 5.1-in. guns.
(c) We should propose an ultimate reduction to a total submarine tonnage of 4,000 tons and a limitation of not more than 45 units.
(d) We should seek to keep all other naval Powers to the lowest submarine tonnage to which they will agree.
Exempt Classes and Annexes.
161. (a) Exempt Vessels. – Our policy should be to lower the 600-ton limit for the Exempt Class (Annex II to Chapter 2 of Section II of the British Draft Disarmament Convention, paragraph (a)) to some such figure as 100 tons, but it is desirable that this should be proposed by some other country. No other alterations to the rules for exempt vessels are desired.
(b) Annexes to the Naval Chapter of the British Draft Disarmament Convention. – Annex I: Definitions. If a new qualitative limitation of cruisers is agreed to the definition of the capital ship will require modification.
Annex V: Rules for Replacement. – This annex contains rules for replacement and the age limits for the various categories. This annex should be maintained.
Annex VI: Rules of Disposal of Vessels of War. This annex should be maintained.
Dominion Quotas.
162. The Naval Staff is in general agreement with the conclusions contained in D.C.(M)(32)32 of the 10th February, 1933, which may be summarised as follows:-
(a) There is no option of the time being but to adhere to the present system, i.e., a Commonwealth quota, or some modification of it which has the same effect, e.g., separate Dominion quotas with transfer within a Commonwealth total.
(b) That if the latter plan be adopted, the following would be a suitable formula for inclusion in the Convention:-
“It hall be permissible for the tonnage limitation figure of any member of the British Commonwealth of Nations to be exceeded, provided that that excess is offset by a corresponding deficiency in the permitted tonnage of other Members.”
(c) The ideal solution of this problem from our point of view would be that the naval strength of other powers should be calculated in relation to the naval strength of the United Kingdom only, the naval strength of the Dominions being left out of account in such calculations the level of the U.K. naval strength, which is based on practical needs, would require to be fixed sufficiently high to safeguard our naval position in the event of one or other of the Dominions not building up to its full quota or not being available for naval assistance in certain contingencies.
(d) While such a solution of this problem is not regarded as practicable at the present time, it is, nevertheless, an objective towards which we might work as and when opportunity offers.
Source: 1935 Naval Conference Admiralty Paper No. 1, April 1934, TNA: ADM 116/3373.
